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While empirical evidence highlights the importance of punishment for cooperation in collective action, it
remains disputed how responsible sanctions targeted predominantly at uncooperative subjects can evolve.
Punishment is costly; in order to spread it typically requires local interactions, voluntary participation, or
rewards.Moreover, theory and experiments indicatethat somesubjects abusesanctioningopportunities by
engaging in antisocial punishment (which harms cooperators), spiteful acts (harming everyone) or revenge
(as a response to being punished). These arguments have led to the conclusion that punishment is
maladaptive. Here, we use evolutionary game theory to show that this conclusion is premature: If
interactions are non-anonymous, cooperation and punishment evolve even if initially rare, and sanctions
aredirectedtowardsnon-cooperatorsonly.Thus,ourwillingnesstopunishfreeridersisultimatelyaselfish
decision rather than an altruistic act; punishment serves as a warning, showing that one is not willing to
accept unfair treatments.
N
umerousexperimentsdemonstratethathumansubjectsareeagertopunishothersforunjustbehaviour
1–6,
thereby suggesting that we are equipped with an inclination for retaliation
7. The evolutionary origin of
this inclination, however, is puzzling because punishment is costly and therefore unlikely to evolve unless
it results in direct or indirect benefits
8–13. One avenue of research has argued that sanctions are more costly for the
punished and that punishment thus gives a relative payoff advantage to the punisher
9,11,12,14. In these models,
punishmentcanevolve,sometimes even ifpunishersare initially rare, ifthere are accompanyingmechanisms such
as voluntary participation in the collective endeavor
11,12, local interactions on a lattice or on a network
9,15–19,o rt h e
option to reward cooperators
13. Surprisingly, it was also demonstrated that defectors who punish other defectors
helpto pavetheway for a cooperative society
14–16. However,while a relativepayoffadvantage for the punisher may
explain the emergence of punishment, it cannot account for the emergence of responsible punishment, targeted at
defectors only. If the mere act of punishing others gives an edge to the punisher, then spite and antisocial
punishment should eventually take over. Most previous studies presumed that only defectors are punished, which
is clearly contradicting experimental evidence from numerous countries
20. Two recent models that also allow
cooperators to be punished have shown that anti-social punishment can fully prevent the evolution of cooperation
and responsible sanctions in both, well-mixed
21and lattice-structured
22 populations. Therefore, the question arises
whether punishment can promote cooperation at all
6.
However,inmostrealinteractions, thedecisiontopunish othersdoes notonlyaffecttherelativepayoffsofthe
players, but also their reputation. If the punishment act can be observed by others, it can pay to sanction only
defectors. A recent experiment suggests that emotions such as anger or moral disgust may have evolved as a
commitment device; they lead people to disregard the immediate consequences of their behaviour in order to
preserve integrity and to maintain their reputation
23. If individuals are able to build up a strict reputation by
displaying a low tolerance for unfair behaviour, then future interaction partners may act more cooperatively.
Recently, dos Santos et. al. have presented an analytical model, combined with computer simulations, showing
that reputation indeed facilitates the co-evolution of cooperation and punishment
24. However, their analytical
model does not allow antisocial punishment, and individuals can only resort to the last action of their peers. A
responsibleuseofsanctionsrequiresalong-runreputationadvantage
25.Here,weunderpinthisargumentwithan
evolutionary model.We derivean exact conditionforthe evolutionof responsiblepunishment in thepresence of
antisocial punishment. Our model shows that reputation allows the co-evolution of cooperation and responsible
sanctions even if both are initially rare.
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Weconsiderapairwisegamewithtwostages.Beforethegamestarts,
a coin toss determines which player is in the role of the donor and
which one is in the role of the recipient. In the initial helping stage,
donors may cooperate and transfer a benefit b to their recipients, at
their own cost c , b, or they may refuse to do so. In the subsequent
punishment stage, recipients decide whether or not to punish the
donor at a cost c, thereby reducing the payoff of the donor by b.
Depending on the outcome of the helping stage, there are four pos-
siblereactions of the recipient: Punishing defectors only (denoted by
R for responsible sanctions), punishing cooperators only (A for anti-
socialpunishment),punishingeverybody(Sforspitefulpunishment)
or punishing nobody (N). Because sanctions are costly, immediate
self-interest speaks against either form of punishment, leading to a
destabilizationofpunishmentintheabsenceofreputation
12.Inorder
toincorporatereputation,weassumethatdonorscananticipatetheir
co-player’s behaviour with probability l, either from previous
encounters, from observation, or from gossip. We can therefore
distinguish four different types of donors. The first type are the C-
players who always cooperate, whereas the second type, the D-
players, never cooperate, regardless of l and the opponent’s repu-
tation. The third type are the opportunistic cooperators, OC, who
optimallyadapttheirbehaviourontheco-player’spunishmentrepu-
tation: They cooperate against social sanctioners, while saving the
cooperation costs against all other recipients, N, A, and S.I fn o
information on the co-player’s reputation is available, OC-donors
cooperatebydefault.Thelasttypeofdonors,opportunisticdefectors
OD, also adjust their behaviour to the recipient’s reputation (in the
same way as OC-donors), but play defect if the recipient’s reputation
is unknown.
Thus, if there is no information about the reputation of the other
group members available, opportunistic cooperators OC just behave
as unconditional cooperators C, and opportunistic defectors OD are
indistinguishable from defectors D. However, once the others’ repu-
tation is known, opportunists can be swayed by the threat of pun-
ishment,whereastheunconditionalstrategiescannot.Asplayerscan
be in both roles, donor and recipient, and since we consider four
strategies for each role (C, OC, OD, D for donors and R,N,A,S for
recipients), there are 16 strategies in total. Note that this is only a
subsetofthefullstrategyspace;forexample,donorsmightalsoapply
therathercounter-intuitive ruletocooperate onlyagainstanti-social
punishers. However, such a strategy is clearly dominated by OC, and
we show in the Supplementary Information (SI) that our results
remain unchanged if we consider the full strategy space.
We study the transmission of strategies with a frequency-depend-
ent birth-death process
26in afinite population of size n. In each time
step, two randomly chosen individuals compare their payoffs and
one of them can switch to the other one’s strategy. This process can
be interpreted as a model for social learning, whereby successful
strategies spread, and, occasionally, random strategy exploration
introducesnovelstrategies(correspondingtomutationsinbiological
models). In the limit of low exploration rates, we provide an analy-
tical approximation, which is complemented with simulations for
frequent exploration (SI Text).
When interactions are completely anonymous (l 5 0), then nei-
ther responsible punishment nor cooperation occurs at not-
ablefrequencies(Fig.1).Instead,donorstendtodefecteitheruncon-
ditionally, or because they are not swayed by responsible sanctions.
Because of the absence of cooperators, antisocial punishment incurs
no costs and can therefore increase to substantial levels through
neutral drift, which is in line with previous studies
21,22. These results,
however, change drastically when the recipient’s reputation is at
stake: If the probability of knowing the others’ type fulfills (see SI)
lw
n{1 ðÞ c{b
n{1 ðÞ czb ðÞ zc{b
, ð1Þ
thenit paysoff forthe recipient to engagein responsible sanctions to
deter opportunists from defection. Notably, this expression simpli-
fiestol.c/(c1b)forlargepopulations,indicatingthatresponsible
punishment is the result of balancing the costs of punishment c with
theprospectsoffuturebenefitsb,butdoesneitherdependsensitively
on cost of cooperation c nor on the magnitude of the punishment b.
In fact, we find that above this threshold, recipients almost immedi-
ately switch to responsible punishment, which in turn promotes the
evolution of cooperative strategies among the donors. Remarkably,
this positive effect of information is largely independent of the
exploration rate, although frequent exploration has a distinct impact
on the abundance of opportunism.
To illustrate the emergence of responsible punishment, we
have traced the evolutionary dynamics (Fig. 2). In the absence of
reputation effects, both, spite and responsible sanctions soon go
extinct, followed by a long period of neutral drift between uncon-
ditional and opportunistic defection, such that everyone defects, as
wellasbetweenantisocialpunishmentandnopunishment,suchthat
no one punishes. On the other hand, if recipients have the oppor-
tunity to build a reputation, then they turn to responsible punish-
ment,whichpromotestheevolutionofopportunismand,eventually,
establishescooperation.Thisholdstrueevenifresponsiblesanctions
are absent in the initial population (Fig. 3): Indeed, starting from a
population of antisocial defectors (DA), mutation and neutral drift
can lead to a population of non-punishing opportunists (ODN). This
kindofopportunismpavesthewayforresponsiblesanctions(ODRor
OCR).
Our results demonstrate that with and without information, spite
isimmediatelydriventoextinction(seeFigs.1–3).Thisisincontrast
to a recent model considering the evolution of antisocial behaviour
in locally subdivided populations
22. However, we show in the
Supplementary Information that spite requires a high degree of
anonymity, small population sizes and low costs of punishment to
Figure 1 | Information promotes the co-evolution of cooperation and
responsible punishment. Time-averaged frequencies for the strategies of
donors (left graph) and recipients (right graph), respectively. Solid lines
indicate exact results for the limiting case of rare exploration. Filled
symbols represent simulation results for low exploration rates (m 5
0.0001) and open symbols are simulations for high exploration rates (m 5
0.1).Theblackdashedlinerepresentsthecriticalinformationlevelgivenby
Eq. (1). Above this information level, individuals make use of responsible
sanctions to deter opportunists from defection. Parameter values are n 5
80, b 5 4, b 5 3, c 5 c 5 1, the strength of selection is set to s 5 0.5.
Simulations were run over a period of 10
10 time steps (i.e., each individual
was allowed to implement more than 10
8 strategy changes).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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they lead to local competition where relative payoff advantages mat-
ter. It is noteworthy that the three conditions of anonymity, small
groupsizesandcheappunishmentarecharacteristicformanylabor-
atory experiments, suggesting that such behavioural studies may
overestimate the impact of spite on human decision making.
The positive effects of reputation are robust with respect to errors
in the perception of the co-players’ reputation, and to extensions of
the strategy space (SI Text and Figs. S3 and S4). Moreover, these
results are not restricted to pairwise interactions: Our results also
carry over to public good games between more than two players (SI
Text and Figs. S5 and S6). Also in that case, there is a critical thresh-
old for the reputation parameter l which needs to be met for coop-
eration and responsible sanctions to evolve. This critical threshold,
however, increases with the number of group members. Thus, large
group sizes threaten the emergence and the stability of responsible
peer punishment, which may explain why most large societies
rather rely on centralized punishment institutions than on self-
governance
19,27,28.
Discussion
Previous evolutionary models could not explain why individuals
learn to deal responsibly with sanctions. Instead, it was either pre-
sumed that punishment is targeted at defectors only
9–16,18, or it was
predicted that evolution leads to non-punishing defectors or spite,
respectively
22.Here,wehaveshownhowreputationcanresolvethese
issues. Non-anonymity makes anti-social punishment and spite
unappealing, and if punishment evolves, then it is systematically
targeted at non-cooperators. Hence, we also question the conven-
tional wisdom that any behaviour, even if abstruse, can become a
common norm as long as deviations are punished
8. Opportunistic
individuals will stop to impose sanctions on pro-social activities,
simply because it is in their own interest to let cooperative outcomes
evolve. In particular, the emergence of anti-social punishment in
some models
21,22, is likely to be a consequence of their assumption
of anonymous interactions. Antisocial punishment has been
observed experimentally in repeated games, but there it could be a
component of retaliation
20,29.
In our model, individuals learn to make use of responsible
punishment because these sanctions serve as a signal to bystan-
ders. In this way, responsible sanctions are a form of weak reci-
procity
30: they are beneficial in the long run, despite being costly in
the short run. If this individual long-run benefit of punishment is
absent (e.g. if reputation effects are precluded), then responsible
sanctions do not evolve. Strong reciprocators (i.e., individuals that
are willing to punish others even if it reduces their absolute fitness
in the long run
31) do not emerge in our model. Thus, responsible
Figure 2 | Time evolution of responsible punishment. Two typical
individual-based simulation runs, without (a) and with (b) reputation. In
both cases, the upper graph depicts the dynamics among the donors’
strategies,whereasthelowergraphshowstheevolutionofstrategiesamong
recipients.While alowinformation regimeresults inneutral drift between
different non-cooperative strategies, individuals almost immediately
switch to social sanctions and cooperation if their reputation is at stake.
Parameter values are m 5 0.0001 and l 5 0 for (a) and l 5 0.3 for (b),
respectively, the other parameter values being the same as in Figure 1.
Figure 3 | Responsiblepunishmentcaninvadewhenrare. Time-averaged
frequenciesofthe16possiblestrategycombinationsandtypicaltransitions
between homogeneous populations. Arrows with dashed lines indicate
neutral drift between the two corresponding strategy combinations.
Arrowswithsolidlinesrepresenttransitionswherethetargetstrategy hasa
fixation probability that exceeds the neutral probability 1/n. Populations
marked with a colored ring can only be invaded through neutral drift. The
Figure illustrates that unconditional defectors can be subverted by
opportunistic defectors, which in turn can be swayed by responsible
sanctions. However, once established, responsible sanctions can be
replaced by unconditional defectors via the (unlikely) path via non-
punishing cooperators, which can be invaded by non-punishing defector
strategies.Parametervaluesaren580,b54,b53,c5c51,s50.5,l5
0.3 and frequencies are calculated for the limit of rare exploration. For
clarity, wehaveonly plotted arrows starting fromstrategies that areplayed
in more than 0.5% of all cases.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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community. Opportunism (that is, the propensity to be swayed by
sanctions), on the other hand, emerges endogenously, once indi-
viduals are able to anticipate the punishment behaviour of their
peers. Of course this implies some cognitive requirements on the
subjects: They have to monitor their co-players and need to pro-
cess and remember this information properly. Subjects in beha-
vioural experiments show an enhanced memory for faces of
defectors
32 and although not tested empirically, one may expect
similar results for the faces of punishers. Humans highly regard
reputation
33; the mere picture of an eye, indicating that someone is
watching
34 or the physical presence of an experimenter
35 can affect
the subjects’ behaviour, often making them more cooperative or
increasing their willingness to punish non-cooperators. In fact, the
capability to gather and transmit information might be a major
cause for the the high levels of cooperation in humans
36.
Under non-anonymity, reputation becomes a strategic variable
and experiments reveal that we make use of sophisticated strategies
when it comes to publicising or concealing information about our-
selves
37. While explicit penalties serve as a warning to others, they
also bear the risk of counter-punishment
38. However, we show that
responsible sanctions remain prevalent even if counter-punishment
is asure event (in which case the costs forthe punisher, c, are as high
as the costs for being punished, b, SI Text and Fig. S2), implying that
we are willing to pay a high price to uphold our reputation
39,40.
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